Evidence—Proof of Damage to Bailed Goods by Buffalo Law Review
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 9 Number 1 Article 95 
10-1-1959 
Evidence—Proof of Damage to Bailed Goods 
Buffalo Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Buffalo Law Review, Evidence—Proof of Damage to Bailed Goods, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 162 (1959). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol9/iss1/95 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Heyser8 9 a police officer followed defendant at a distance of 100 yards for
more than one-quarter of a mile. In Marsellus"' the officer followed defendant
for two miles.
In considering the present case, the court found the opportunity for
observation afforded the two police officers to be comparable to that found in
the cases just described. It is submitted that the facts of these four cases
demonstrate that there may be considerable latitude in defining the meaning
of "adequate opportunity for observation."
In a concurring opinion,9 ' Judge Van Voorhis deplored the majority's
departure from "the almost universal custom of Police and Justices' Courts,
' 2
which requires that speeding violations be established by speedometer or radar
readings rather than by observations of eyewitnesses "no matter how expert
they may be. ' 3 He pointed out that the need for supporting evidence would
be eliminated if the police were to make and keep records of regular tests of
measuring devices. Despite the appeal of this viewpoint to traffic courts and
motorists, it now appears to be well settled that readings of untested radar
equipment, if corroborated by testimony of policemen who have had an ade-
quate opportunity for observation, will be sufficient as a matter of law to sus-
tain a speeding conviction.
PRoor OF DAMAGE TO BAILED GOODS
Where a mutually beneficial bailment exists the bailee's duty is to
exercise reasonable workmanship upon the bailed goods.9 4 Upon completion
of the work the goods must be returned to the bailor reasonably fit for the
known use intended.95 If the goods are returned damaged and the bailor
shows they were not so damaged when bailed, a prima Jacie case is made out
against the bailee, 98 whereupon the bailee, if he is to escape liability, must
show reasonable care was used by him.Y7
In Aronette Mfg. Co. v. Capital Piece Dye Works, Inc.98 defendant
undertook to waterproof plaintiff's textiles after receiving them from a third
party which had subjected the textiles to a crease resisting process. Defendant
first sent three samples, which he had waterproofed, to the plaintiff for inspec-
tion. He also informed plaintiff that a few of the pieces when originally re-
ceived by defendant had an odor. Upon plaintiff's approval of the samples,
defendant waterproofed the rest of the textiles. When received by plaintiff,
the goods contained an odor. Upon assurance by defendant that the odor
89. People v. Heyser, supra note 86.
90. People v. Marsellus, supra note 87.
91. Supra note 84 at 128, 181 N.Y.S.2d 496.
92. Ibid. at 130, 181 N.Y.S.2d 497.
93. Id.
94. Foster v. Pettibone, 7 N.Y. 433 (1852).
95. Douglas v. Hart, 103 Conn. 685, 131 A.2d 401 (1925).
96. Wintringham v. Hayes, 144 N.Y. 1, 38 N.E. 999 (1894).
97. Gerdau Co. v. Bowne Morton Stores Inc., 1 A.D.2d 581, 151 N.Y.S.2d 831, aff'd
2 N.Y.2d 905, 161 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1956).
98. 6 N.Y.2d 465, 190 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1959).
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would disappear, plaintiff manufactured raincoats from the textiles. The odor
did not disappear and the goods were a total loss to plaintiff. Plaintiff there-
upon brought suit against defendant.
Defendant contended that the evidence 1) was insufficient to show that
the goods were undamaged at the time he received them and, therefore, no
inference of his guilt could be raised which would necessitate his coming for-
ward with evidence, and 2) did not show that the odor was traceable to his
waterproofing process.
The Court of Appeals held that defendant's statement, that a few of
the goods had an odor when received by him, manifested the implication that
the remaining goods were odor free. This implication was substantiated by
the fact that the sample pieces sent to plaintiff did not contain any odor.
These findings sufficed to show that the goods were in good condition when
defendant received them, and to raise the inference that the damage occurred
during his period of exclusive control. Therefore, his silence at the trial justi-
fied the jury's finding that damage resulted from an improper discharge of
his bailment obligation.
In many cases, where there is injury to the plaintiff, the only reasonable
inference is that the damage was the result of fault. Yet, because one party
has had exclusive control over the goods, any clue as to the possibility that
damage occurred during this period of control lies with the defendant alone.
It is virtually impossible for an aggrieved plaintiff in such case to prove the
injury. Therefore, it does not seem inequitable to expect the party who has
had exclusive control to explain his conduct during such period, and if he
chooses to remain silent, to construe that silence against him.
MALPRACTICE: BASIS FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY
Before a controversy may be submitted to the jury the complaining party
must establish a prima facie case. Failure to do so requires the court to dis-
miss the complaint as a matter of law.
In a recent New York malpractice action the plaintiff alleged she had
suffered a partial loss of sensation and taste in her tongue following an ex-
traction of one of her teeth by the defendant dentist, and that such loss was
the result of the defendant's negligence in severing two nerves during the
extraction 09 The defendant not only denied having severed the nerves but
further testified he had done no work on the side of the tooth wherein the
nerves lay.
At the trial the Supreme Court disregarded the testimony of an expert
witness for the plaintiff who had testified that, in his opinion, the lost senses
in the tongue were caused by the severance of the nerves during the extraction
performed by the defendant, and dismissed the complaint at the close of the
plaintiff's case. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
99. Cassano v. Hagstrom, 5 N.Y.2d 643, 187 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1959).
